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DR,J, CLAY SMITH, JR.
COMMISSIONER, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
before the
NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW,
SPONSORED BY THE SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
~1
New Orleans, Louisiana
I
May 1, 1980
1

OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION
OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
AND THE NATIONAL ,LABOR RELATIONS, BOARD

My topic concerns the overlc;tpping jurisdiction of the
EEOC and the NLRB.

By overlapping jurisdiction, I mean those

situations where the conduct of an employer or a union may
violate both the National Labor· Relations

~ct

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
situations, how

~hou1d

the government respond?

the EEOC and the NLRB process and investigate

and Title VII
In these
Should both
these~comp1aints

and then seek or allow relief in independent forums? ·Or,
in the interest of'

ef~iciency

and avoiding duplicative

processing of complaints, should one agency cede its
jurisdiction over the complaint to the other so that the charged
party has to deal with a single governmental agency?
I cannot give simple yes or no answers to these questions,
but I will share with you a consideration that influences my
answers.

In preparation for today, the most overwhelming

impression I came away with after studying overlapping
jurisdiction is that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and the National Labor Relations Board should work more closely
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together to eliminate invidious employment discrimination.
Our two agencies must bet,ter utilize 'e'ach other t s resources
and expert~se. We in government and the academic communit~
,•
need to focus on how agency collaboration can further the
respective missions of both the EEOC and the NLRB.

The

very nature of the government, however, precludes a quick
response to this challenge.

In the interim, this paper

sets out in a cursory fashion how the EEOC and NLRB have
re'sponded to discrimination issues, labor-management decisions
of particular interest to the Commission, and issues on which
the two agencies differ and agree.

1.

BACKGROUND.

Beginning in 1935, and continuing for approximately
the ,next thirty years, the National Labor Relations Act
was the dominant piece of legislation in the field of labor
law.

There was, of course, activity under the Fair Labor

Standards Act such as minimum wage, overtime and child labor
disputes and there was litigation under various state Fair
Employment Laws.

The bulk of labor practice, however, was in

the labor-management area.
In 1964, a far-reaching piece of civil rights legislation
was passed.

One of the sections of that Act, commonly referred

to as Title VII, makes it unlawful for employers, unions,
and employment agencies to discriminate against employees and
job applicants on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or
national origin.

It is safe to say that Title VII law now

,.

~

.
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shares pre-eminence with the law under the NLRB, and that
these are the two dominant areas of labor law.
·1

The Irowth of Title VII law is nothing short of
t

phenomenal.

There has never been anything like it.

In 1964

Congress anticipated that, the EEOC in its first year of operation,
1965-1966, would receive approximately 2,000

char~es.

9,000 charges were actually filed ,the first year.
the number grew exponentially.
95,000 charges were filed.

Nearly

From there

In fiscal year 1976, nearly

Title

VII.require~ th~,~~OC

to

investigate each of these charges.
In 1976 the Commission refined its charge intake
procedure and cut down the number of charge filings.
According to the annual reports of both the EEOC and the NLRB,
during fiscal year 1979

the National Labor Relations Board

receLved approximately 41,000 unfair labor charges and 13,500
complaints dealing with election representation questions for
a toa1 of 54 to 55,000 complaints.

During the same period,

EEOC received approximately 69,000 Title VII charges, 2,000
age complaints and another 400 equal pay complaints for a
total of approximately 72,000 complaints.

Additionally,

according to estimates of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, approximately 5,500 civil rights
employment discrimination cases were filed in Federal District
Courts in fiscal year 1979.
At this time, no one knows how many Title VII charges
also raise issues under the National Labor Relations

Ac~

nor do

we know how many complaints filed with the NLRB raise Title VII

i

.

4
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issues.

However, given the heavy volume of disputes under

each Act, it is probable that there aTe' substantial numbers
of complaint~
filed raising factual and substantive issues
.i
,
.
relevant to or controlled by the law or policies of both
t

the NLRB and the EEOC.

2.

ELIMINATING-DISCRIMINATION THROUGH COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING PROCESSES: EEOC INITIATIVES

On March 25, 1980, the Commission passed a resolution
which in brief recognizes good faith efforts by a union or
employer to negotiate specific equal employment opportunity
provisions as terms and conditions of a collective bargaining
agreement without the cooperation of the other party.
In recognition of this situation, the resolution states that
the Commission will take into account the lack of culpability
I

of this innocent party and refrain from bringing suit against
it; the Commission will sue the other party to the collective
bargaining agreement.~t

~/ It should be noted that the gravamen of the resolution
is contained in Paragraph 3. At this time, the resolution
merely instructs the staff to develop, amend, and modify
written instructions to the field staff that clearly reflects
that criteria necessary to establish the standards of "good
faith" . . . In all instances, no administrative case
processing or enforcement actions shall be invoked under the
resolution, unless "approved . . . by the Commission." Until
the staff presents standards to carry out the intent of the
resolution, existing policies remain applicable, in my view.

r

\.
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~he

Commission believes that this resolution is in

keeping with the Supreme Court's holding in Weber (United
SteelworkeJs of America v. Weber, 99 S.Ct. 272 (1979).
r

In Weber, the Court held that labor and management should
be provided with a climate conducive to the voluntary
elimination of unlawful employment practices.

The Commission

feels that through the resolution it is providing an incentive
for parties to collective bargaining con-tracts to voluntarily
eliminate discriminatory practices.
Some observers felt that in the pas·t EEOC too often
included in an enforcement action as a defendant, the very
party -- be it labor or management -- that had argued
that a discriminatory practice be corrected.

To their

dismay, these parties often found themselves as
with

the'all~ged wro~gdoer.

co-defendants

After.furtli.er staff

consideration the EEOC may now refrain from prosecuting these
parties if they have in good faith attempted to eliminate
discriminatory practices.

The Commission defines a good

faith effort as those "actions of a compelling and aggressive
nature evaluated on a case-by-case basis.1t

The Commission

instructed the General Counsel and the Office of Field
Services to develop written instructions for

implem~nting

policy.
I voted for this resolution because I believe:

this
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(1) the elimination of employment discrimination
is an urgent national goal, however achieved.
~ee

I

u.s.

Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415

36

. '(1974) ;
.(2) despite progress in eliminating discrimination

from the workplace, it still exists; discrimination
is pervasive, deep rooted, intractable;
(3) the more fronts the government can bring to bear

on this problem, the sooner our society will truly
be just and'fair . .
I

share my colleagues' view that this resolution is'

another weapon in the battle to eliminate employment discrimination.
Yet even with these feelings, I nonetheless had an uneasiness
about the resolution.

Initially, I was hesitant

~o

vote for

it because I felt there we're· some troublesome areas in the
I

collective bargaining processes which had not been sufficiently
explored requiring more study prior to the vote on the resolution.~/
Indeed, if not handled' correctly, adverse consequences
could flow from this resolution -- the most serious being
"forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . .

"

Such

eventualities ,would of course impair collective bargaining

~/ To this end, while the staff back-up memorandum was

published by the trade press, the Commission did not vote on
or approve the staff paper.

,

"
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and thwart the very purpose of the National Labor Relations
Act.

This wesolution will raise some difficult questions for
J

the Commission: . whether "actions of a compelling and
agressive nature" means that a union ,should strike rather
than accede to discriminatory terms?

To escape Title VII

prosecution,. should a union be compelled to first inform
an employer that if it does not alter a policy the union
will file a Title VII charge against the employer?

Should.

the standard be that if an employer is unable to negotiate
with a discriminatory labor organization, the employer
should refuse to bargain with the uni'on and risk an unfair
labo~

charge?

On the otherhand, if parties to a

collective bargaining. contract do not have to take. actions
anywhere approaching the gravity of those listed above, than
the Commission may have relinquished its prosecutorial
discretion for little in return.
To properly implement the collective bargaining resolution, the Commission should fully understand all those circumstances in which EEO issues arise during the collective

j,

't '
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bargaining processes.

Under the resolution,~'at a minimum,

Commission staff is going to have to secure a greater appreciation of the dynamics involved in collective bargaining just to
ensure that the government does not intrude where it ought not
y
~
1

to be.

I believe 'one possible consequence of this resolution

is that the EEOC may become or be called upon to become more
involved in labor-management disputes.

The Commission may file'

more amicus briefs before the National Labor Relations Board or
actually intervene in the administrative process so that our
views are on record.

-:..' One of my personal concerns, is the extent to which the EEOC
may 'make a "good faith" determination comparable to the NLRB
'''good faith" standard without a hearing mechanism -- since good
faith is solely a question of fact. Is "good faith" as we have
used the term in the resolution really comparable to the use of
that term under NLRB policy? In the context of the administrative processing of a charge during which good faith becomes an
issue -- should that charge be settled during fact finding? By
voting to absolutely require ourselves to take good faith into
account, i~ nationwide or regional bargaining where the giveand-take in the collective bargaining process is critical to
reach accord and industrial peace, will we really have theinvestigatOl:Y capacity to', :r-ev.iew"'a p:s;'o,ces's whi'ch' -maY; coveJ:i.~ nUmber of months
and during whicc' certain equal employmerit opportuntty gains may
have been achieved, but not in the area subject to the charge investigated? Will the good faith-notion become 'a oottom line
concept? By using the term good faith in the manner applied by
the NLRB, will the EEOC create a judicial. standard for review or
de novo hearings, which could effect its own prosecutorial discretion? Ought the EEOC be careful not to adopt a good faith
principle like the NLRB if the nature of the good faith doctrine
is to reach a common agreement as opposed to one focusing on
"specific terms"? Could EEO fall within a specific term category? In areas where the Supreme Court has limited the scope of
the, good faith doctrine, as, exercised by the Board, if the EEOC uses
this standard do we run the risk of waiving our discretionary
power to sue or by this policy do we create an affirmative defense
which may shift the burden of persuasion to the EEOC? Hopefully,
these questions will be considered by the General Counsel, Field
Services and Policy Implementation arms of the EEOC in any future
proposals made to the Commission.

4 •
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3.

THE NLRB'S RESPONSE TO RACE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION
.ISSUES
.1

i

A.

Bekins - Handy Andy

i

The NLRB has consistently taken a strong and vigorous
approach on discrimination issues arising in the context of
unfair labor charges.

However,

activist approach in dealing

t~e

wit~

Board retreated from an

equal employment opportunity

issues in the context of representation proceedings.

Bekins

Moving and Storage Co. of Florida, Inc., 211 NLRB 138 (1974)
•

and the Board's subsequent reversal of that decision only,cwo
and a half years later in Handy Andy, 228 NLRB 447 (1977),
illustrates the retrenchment.
By way of background, Bekins and Handy' Andy both had
their genesis in two earlier cases' -- one decided by the
Supreme Court the other by the Eighth Circuit.

In Steele v.

f

Louisville & Nashville Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), a union which
was the bargaining agent for a group of railroad workers
entered into an agreement with an employer which virtually
prohibited blacks in the unit from working solely because of
their race.

The Supreme Court ruled that the union, as the

bargaining representative of ali. :enip'loyees' 'in' a··grveri· unit,- must
act for all members of that class "without hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially and in good faith", and cannot sacrifice
the interests of minority and women workers.

The union has

a duty of fair representation.
The Eighth Circuit' s decision in NLRB v.' Mansi'on House

4 •
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Center Management, 473 F.2d 471 (1973), actually set the stage
for the

Bek~ns-Hand

Board rule

Andy controversy.

In Mansion House, the

that the company" s failure to bargain with the'

union was an unfair labor practice.

The Board then petitioned

the Court of Appeals for enforcement of its order to the
company to bargain.

The company's defense to the NLRB

petition was that the union was dis,criminating.

The Eighth

Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order and stated:
the remedial machinery of the National
Labor Relations Act cannot be available to a
union which is unwilling to correct past practices
of racial discrimination.

Federal complicity

through recognition of a discriminating union
serves not only to condone ,the discrimination,
but in effect l~g:i:t"i.:mizes and perpetuates s'uch
invidious pra,ctices.

Id at 477,

Hence, the Eighth Circuit held that the enforcement machinery
of the Board and the Courts could not, consistent with the
constitutional requirement of equal protection, be made
available to discriminating unions.

The court felt that

enforcement of a Board order in favor of a discriminating
union was analagous to court enforcement of a restrictive
convenant outlawed by the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kr'aemer,

334 U.S. I (1948).

•
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The Board's decision in Bekins Moving expanded the
rationale of Mansion House -- that the Constitution precludes the
1

NLRB from b.~sto~i.ng any. benefit on·a dtscr":i:1llinating union. ·
The Board in Bekins declared that not only would it refuse
to aid unions which discrimina.ted bu t

that even if a dis-

criminating union was selected by a majority of workers in
the bargainins unit, the Board might refuse to certify it
as the ·official bargaining unit.

Bekin-s Moving and Storage

Co., 211 NLRB 138 (1974).
In its ruling, the Board instructed employers that
after the vote in the bargaining unit they could file an
objection to union certification based on discrimination and
that this objection would be analyzed in the same manner as
any other conduct objected to affecting an election.

The

Boara would then determine on a case-by-case basis whether
evidence of discrimination voided a union election victory.
Bekins meant that unions'racial and sexual practices
frequently could come under close scrutiny.
Bekins was criticized on many fronts.

Some thought

the decision contrary to the National Labor Relations Act
itself because the Board was suggesting that it would withhold certification of a labor organization even though it
had been selected by a majority of the unit employees.

The

agreement here was that this procedure would violate Section (7)
rights of employees -- the right to bargain collectively
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through representatives of their own

choo~ing.

Another

criticism was that employers exploited the Bekins holding
1

by injecti~
, charges of discrimination as a delaying
tactic so as to avoid collective bargaining altogether
rather than being sincere in their efforts to eliminate
discrimination.

Finally, some observers feit that the

constitutional underpining of the decision was simply wrong.
They argued that Board certification of a union was not
government

enforcement or government approval of union

activity and hence, there was no state action restricted by
the Fifth Amendment.
The Board embraced these criticisms in Handy Andy,

228 NLRB 447 (1977) and reversed·Bekfns.

Handy Andy held

that the Board was not constitutionally required to
cons'ider allegations about a union' s discriminatory practices
in a representation proceeding.

The Board said that while

certification conferred some benefits on a union, the Board
by certifying a union

was not placing its imprimatur on

union conduct "lawful or otherwise. 1f

~ny

Certification meant

only that in a given unit the majority of employees had
selected their bargaining representative.

No ."state action"

was involved.
B.

Discrimination Issues in the Con"t'e"xt'o"f Un'fa'ir
Labor Practices

The Board has and continues to take forceful action
against employers and unions which practice unlawful discrimination.

ABA -
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Handy Andy stated only that the Board would refrain from
hearing disctimination issues in representation proceedings.
..
,I
The decision emphasized that discrimination could and should
'

I .

be raise.d in the context of unfair labor practice proceedings.
This area simply does not lend itself.to a brief
discussion.

Suffice it to say that an employee can charge

their bargaining representative with'unfair labor practices
where the union has violated its duty of fair representation.
For example, in Independent Metal Workers Union, Local No.1
(Hughes Tool), 147 NLRB 1573 (1964), the Board held that
where a union refused to process the grievance of a black
worker in the bargaining unit solely because of his.race,
the union has breached the duty of fair representation and has
.'

violated
8(b)(l)(A), 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) of the National
,
Labor Relations Act.

In Pacific Maritime Association, 209

NLRB 599, the Board held a union violated Section 8(b) (1) and
8(b)(2) of the NLRA by breaching its duty of fair representation
when it refused to refer women because of their sex to
employment through the union's hiring hall.

Of course, where

employers have discriminated, they too have been found guilty
of unfair labor practices.

See,

e.~:g~';~

Farmer'S:"

'Coo~pe·r'a·tlve

Compress, 194 NLRB 85 (1971).

c.

An Unfair Labor Practice as a Violation of Title

Issue of Dual Remedies

Although I have found no cases directly on point, I
believe that a charging party is free to file a Title VII

V~I:

•
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charge ,against his or her bargaining representative and at
the same time exercise his or her rights under the National
Labor Relatiins Act and charge the union with discrimination
r

and violating the duty of fair representation.

The principle

of dual remedies was recognized and approved by the Supreme
Court in a related context in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,
415 U.S. 36 (1974) (invocation of 'procedures under a collective
bargaining contract do not preclude a charging party from
filing a Title VII charge against the employer.)
4.

UNION ACCESS TO EMPLOYER EEO RECORDS

The Board has ruled that unions ,can secure an employer's
EEO records if their collective 'bargaining contract with the
employer contains a non-discrimination clause.

In

Westinghouse Electric Corp., 139 NLRB No. 19 (1978), the
Board' held that a union was entitled to secure statistical data
on minority and female employees and all EEO charges involving
unit employees .::~:I

Westinghouse also held that although the

union could not secure the company's affirmative action
program,which ,is required of all government contractors, the
union was entitled to the underlying statistical data.

In a

related case, the Board ruled that ,the union was entitled to the
race and sex of job applicants at the company. ' E'ast' Datt'on Tool

& Die Co., 239 NLRB No. 20 (1978).
~/ The petition for enforcement in Westinghouse is presently
pending before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals - Nos.
78-2067, 2262, Nos. BO-llBl, 82, B3.
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These two decisions are important to the Commission
because they make valuable profile information available to
labor organizations.

The Commission needs to know whether unions

i

are taking ,ladvantage
of the West'in'ghouse decision and requesting
.
EEO charges, workforce profiles, and statistical data.

How

this information will be utilized is particularly important
in light of the previously discussed Commission resolution
regarding elimination of discriminatory practices through
collective bargaining.

Since unions can secure EEO information

only in limited situations,will they be able to complain to
the EEOC that

the~

were uninformed on a particular practice?

Indeed, if information is power than the Commission may be
able to better evaluate good faith bargaining on the part
of unions, or the lack thereof.
5.

,-- ,

UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND RELIGIOUS
",' ACCOMMODATION;" THE NLRB" S'GENERAL COUNSEL
AND EEOC TAKING OPPOSING POSITIONS

Although there would appear to be an enormous potential
for conflict between interpretations of the National Labor
Relations Act and the Commission t s interpretati'on of Title
VII, there has been minimal conflict.

The one area where the

two agencies have taken opposing positions is on union security
agreements and Title VII's duty to accommodate religious·beliefs.
The problem arises because some employees have religious beliefs
which do not allow them in good conscience to join or financially
support labor organizations.

Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA

permits employees and unions to agree that all employees must
pay union dues as a condition of continued employment.

The

unions feel that all of those who receive the benefits of its
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representa~ion

and advocacy should contribute to the union

and pay dues.
Section 703(c) of Title VIr prohibits employers and
unions from discriminating on the basis of religion. In
/
1972, whe~ Co~gress amended Title VII, it added Section 79l(j)
which states that the duty to refrain from discrimination on
the basis of religion includes an obligation to accommodate
the religious beliefs of employees, unless doing so-would
create undue hardship.
The NLRB's General Counsel, however, has taken the
position before the Board in Scandia Log Homes,

1-9~CA;"10.925l

that since the NLRB protects union security agreements, 'Section
701(j) does not preclude the discharge of an employee with
religious objections to joining a union in a shop which has a
union security agreement, regardless of the possibility of
accommodation without hardship.

The General Counsel points to

the specific exemption for health care institutions

under Section

19 of the NLRA as proof that Congress did not intend any other
employees covered by a union security clause to be exempt from
the mandatory payment of dues.
The EEOC has filed an amicus brief with the Board pointing out that the General Counsel's position has been rejected by
all three Circuit Courts of Appeals which have addressed the
issue.

See Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.

1976) cert. denied sub nom.; International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers v. Hopkins, 433

u.s.

908 (1977); McDaniel v.

Essex Internation-al, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978); Anderson v.
General Dynamics, 589 F.2d 397 (9th eire 1978).
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Also, Congress is now focusing on this "apparent
conflict.

The House has already passed H.R. 4774 which would.

It

~

amend the ~ational Labor Relations Act.

This provision

would apply to all employees who can show membership in a
bona fide religion which has historically held conscientious
objections to joining or financially supporting a union.
The bill allows these persons to refrain from joining or
paying dues to a union on the condition that they pay an
equivalent amount to charity.

H.R. 4774 is still pending

before the Senate.
6.

IDENTICAL APPROACHES TO ISSUES ARISING UNDER
-. BOTH-THE-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND
.....
TITLE VII
•

_ _ _ _ •••

_

•••

---r-.. -

'4'

The issue of successor corporations and attendant
liability arises under both the NLRA and Title VII.

Indeed,

in one of the earliest Commission enforcement actions, .EEOC
found itself suing a successor corporation.

The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of the successor because
the charging party had only filed charges of discrimination
against the predecessor.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit

reasoned that since the focus of the NLRA and Title VII were
similar -- extending protection to workers -- the principle
of successorship utilized in NLRA cases should also control
Title VII cases.

The Appeals Court therefore· reversed the

dismissal but cautioned that just as in NLRA cases, the
liability of a successor must be determined on a case-by-case
basis.

EEOC v. MacMillan Blo·edel, 503 F .2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1978).

~

·

",
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The EEOC has also urged the courts to follow the
standards promulgated by the NLRB for

determini~g

whether

"

separate cofporate entities in fact constitute a single
r

employer.

Since Title VIIts jurisdiction does not attach

unless an employer has 15 full time employees, the issue
of holding separate corporate entities as one is especially
significant.

In' Baker v. S'tuart'"B'r'oa"dc'a's'tlhg Co., 560

F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977), the Commission found that a
communications firm owned several radio ,stations and had"
incorporated each individually and ,that no single unit
employed fifteen workers.

The Court, at the EEOC's urging,

adopted the NLRB's standard for consolidating separate
entities and held there was Title VII jurisdiction.
7•

PROTESTING DISCRIMINATION' AND

E~1PLOY.ER

RETALIATION

The Commission and the NLRB recognize that employer
retaliation undermines the very operation of their respective
statutes.

Employees will be reluctant to assert their

if an atmosphere of fear pervades.

They must feel free to

protest violations of Federal labor laws.
demonstrate

~he

r~ghts

The cases below

interplay of Title VII and the National Labor

Relations Act irr this area.
A.

Emporium Capwell 'Co. v. Waco, 420 U. S, 50 (1975)

is the leading NLRA case

employee protests

In that case, a department store had

over discrimination.
a collective bargaining
and stock persons.

deali~g"with

~greement

with a union of store clerks

The agreement recognized that the union

was the sole collective bargaining agent for all covered

I
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employees and it prohibited discrimination.
A group of black employees believed that certain
company employment practices were racist and that the
~

r

collective bargaining grievance procedures were
inadequate to remedy this problem.

These employees began

to picket the store and demanded to meet with the top store
management.

The company fired the protesting employees after

they

to cease their activities and as a result a

refuse~

complaint was filed against' the company alleging that its
conduct was retaliatory and violated 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.·
In Emporium the Supreme Court defined the issue before
it as whether the employees' attempt to engage in separate
bargaining was protected by Section 7 of the Act or proscribed
by9(a).

The Court decided' in favor of the employer.

It

notep that the Board had found that the union was doing
everything it possibly could under the grievance
to remedy discrimination.

procedures

It reasoned that the employees'

conduct was not protected because it was in derrogation of
the union's status as the designated exclusive bargaining
representative.

The Court noted that even assuming the

company's conduct violated Title VII's prohibition against
retaliation "the same.·'eonduct",is· 'not -necessar.ily. entitled
to affirmative protection from the NLRA."

B.

King v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 476 F.Supp

495 (N.D. Ill. 1978)raddressed the other side of the issue,
specifically whether conduct protesting discrimination in
contravention of a collective bargaining agreement is protected
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by the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, Section 704.
In King, a

~lack

male joined a picket line during work hours

~.

outside his/employer's plant protesting his company's
racial policies.

According to the collective bargaining

agreement, work stoppages were prohibited.

After being

ordered to return to work,' King continued to picket and
was fired.

Thereafter, King filed a Title VII charge

claiming his employer retaliated against him.
Relying on Emporium, the district court

rej~cted

the

contention that 704(a)'s right to oppose employment discrimination included the use of a strike prohibited by the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement.

The Court held that

if King's work stoppage was protected by 704(a) the union's
promise not to strike would have been devalued and ultimately
the collective bargaining process would be impaired.

c. The Federal government needs to be more attentive
to the increasing tendency of workers to dual file charges
with Federal agencies.
to retaliation charges.

This is especially true with regard
For example, in a non-union setting,

if a worker protests his or her employer's discriminatory
wages and is then retaliated against and files a complaint
with both the EEOC and the NLRB, what are· 'approp;riate
agency responses? Two independent statutory violations may
have occurred -- the employee's 8(a)(1) right to engage in
concerted activities and Title VII's 704(a) right to oppose
discrimination.

In this· day-of higher costs and the need for

ABA -
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more efficient management, should one agency cede its jurisdiction so as to avoid duplicative investigations?,
.(

ExJcutive
Order 12067 authorizes the Commission to .
t
'
coordinate the Federal government's civil rights efforts.
EEOC is to consolidate overlapping interests wherever it can
appropriately do so.

I certainly do not believe the

situation I posed above falls within the scope of this
Order.

Furthermore, in view of the important

s~atutory

rights involved, I would feel ill at ease if one agency
refused to invoke the full extent of its own jurisdiction'if by
dO~!l9 so the 'publ'±'c,

good' :achieves' 'immediate 'and res'olute 'elimination

of discrimination.

On the other hand, I feel that in these

days of higher costs and the need for more efficient allocation
of resources, it is important to air the issue.

It warrants

study.

CONCLUSION.
The EEOC and the NLRB are vested with independent
legislative mandates--the interes'ts of' which 'overlap.

I'n

programs and coordination. both agencies must, and I am sure
will, exercise the full power of the law to eliminate the
badges of slavery and all forms of discrimination.

Over-

lapping jurisdictional interests are not per se contrary to
the notion of governmental efficiency.

It is ignorance of

the processes and falling short of our mandate to eliminate
discrimination that is inefficient.

The EEOC and the NLRB
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should strive to work more closely-to avoid falling short.
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